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Abstract	  This	  study	  is	  investigating	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  percentage	  of	  non-­‐guaranteed	  money	  or	  length	  in	  NFL	  contracts	  reflects	  how	  risky	  players	  are	  as	  judged	  by	  past	  statistics.	  	  While	  sports	  economists	  have	  completed	  numerous	  studies	  on	  the	  motivational	  power	  of	  incentives,	  a	  study	  trying	  to	  identify	  the	  riskiness	  of	  players	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  non-­‐guaranteed	  money	  and	  length	  of	  contract	  is	  a	  new	  idea.	  	  	  	   Contract	  details	  were	  gathered	  for	  running	  backs	  and	  wide	  receivers	  on	  NFL	  rosters	  for	  the	  2012	  season	  from	  rotoworld.com.	  	  Players	  who	  were	  still	  on	  rookie	  contracts	  and	  who	  were	  primarily	  special	  teams	  players	  were	  excluded.	  	  Career	  statistics	  were	  also	  compiled,	  including	  yards	  per	  attempt,	  touches	  per	  game,	  touchdowns	  per	  game,	  games	  missed,	  and	  age.	  	  These	  variables	  will	  be	  used	  to	  capture	  the	  inconsistency,	  susceptibility	  to	  injury,	  and	  other	  types	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  will	  identify	  how	  risky	  they	  are.	  	   Regressions	  were	  run	  testing	  both	  percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  and	  contract	  length	  as	  dependent	  variables.	  	  Independent	  variables	  that	  were	  tested	  include	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  of	  key	  statistics	  based	  on	  position,	  career	  average	  of	  the	  mentioned	  key	  statistics,	  games	  missed	  per	  year,	  age,	  and	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team.	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Chapter	  I:	  Introduction	  	  	   Contracts	  in	  the	  NFL	  have	  evolved	  to	  become	  more	  and	  more	  complicated.	  	  When	  signing	  a	  player,	  many	  details	  need	  to	  be	  reached,	  including	  a	  base	  salary,	  contract	  length,	  and	  incentives	  like	  unguaranteed	  money.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  is	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  that	  a	  team	  can	  avoid	  paying	  by	  cutting	  a	  player.	  	  This	  paper	  is	  investigating	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  percentage	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  or	  length	  in	  NFL	  contracts	  reflects	  how	  risky	  players	  are	  as	  judged	  by	  past	  statistics.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  pinpointing	  the	  type	  of	  players	  through	  statistical	  analysis	  that	  should	  be	  offered	  less	  guaranteed	  money	  or	  shorter	  contracts	  is	  a	  new	  idea.	  	  Adaptations	  to	  NFL	  rules	  and	  regulations	  on	  free	  agency	  and	  salary	  caps	  have	  lead	  to	  more	  emphasis	  on	  managing	  the	  risk	  of	  NFL	  teams.	  	  Besides	  providing	  motivation	  to	  players,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  unguaranteed	  money	  and	  shorter	  contracts	  are	  ways	  to	  protect	  NFL	  teams	  from	  risk	  and	  transfer	  it	  to	  the	  players.	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  what	  risk	  is	  involved	  when	  signing	  players	  in	  the	  NFL.	  	  Like	  any	  sports	  organizations,	  win	  maximization	  is	  the	  ultimate	  goal,	  as	  success	  leads	  to	  more	  revenue	  through	  television	  deals,	  ticket	  sales,	  and	  other	  memorabilia	  sales.	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  successful,	  teams	  must	  attract	  the	  most	  talented	  players	  to	  their	  team	  by	  offering	  them	  better	  contracts	  then	  other	  competitors.	  	  However,	  these	  players	  are	  being	  offered	  wages	  that	  reflect	  past	  performance,	  and	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  determine	  if	  future	  performance	  will	  be	  the	  same.	  	  If	  future	  performance	  after	  the	  contract	  signing	  is	  high,	  then	  the	  team’s	  risk	  will	  have	  paid	  off	  as	  the	  team	  would	  be	  successful	  and	  their	  revenue	  will	  more	  then	  make	  up	  for	  the	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player’s	  wage.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  chance	  that	  the	  player’s	  future	  performance	  will	  be	  below	  average	  and	  the	  team	  will	  suffer	  in	  terms	  of	  wins.	  	  Revenue	  will	  be	  significantly	  lower	  in	  this	  case,	  but	  the	  team	  is	  still	  obligated	  to	  pay	  the	  new	  star	  player’s	  high	  wage	  regardless.	  	  These	  two	  situations	  on	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum	  demonstrate	  the	  risk	  that	  team’s	  take	  when	  signing	  a	  player.	  	  	   Contract	  details	  and	  career	  statistics	  were	  gathered	  for	  players	  on	  NFL	  rosters	  for	  the	  2012	  season.	  Players	  who	  were	  still	  on	  rookie	  contracts	  and	  who	  were	  primarily	  special	  teams	  players	  were	  excluded.	  	  Players	  on	  rookie	  contracts	  do	  not	  have	  any	  past	  statistics	  in	  the	  NFL,	  so	  contract	  negotiations	  were	  based	  on	  college	  performance	  or	  other	  factors	  instead.	  	  Additionally,	  there	  are	  more	  NFL	  regulations	  governing	  rookie	  contracts	  that	  make	  them	  very	  different	  then	  contracts	  for	  veteran	  players.	  	  Specialty	  team	  players	  were	  excluded	  because	  they	  are	  judged	  by	  statistics	  that	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  study’s	  regressions.	  	  Career	  statistics	  that	  were	  compiled	  include	  yards	  per	  attempt,	  touches	  per	  game,	  touchdowns	  per	  game,	  games	  missed,	  and	  age.	  	  These	  variables	  will	  be	  used	  to	  capture	  the	  inconsistency,	  susceptibility	  to	  injury,	  and	  other	  types	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  will	  identify	  how	  risky	  they	  are.	  	   Regressions	  are	  run	  testing	  both	  percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  and	  contract	  length	  as	  dependent	  variables.	  	  Percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  is	  a	  suitable	  measure	  of	  risk,	  because	  it	  shows	  what	  percentage	  of	  the	  maximum	  value	  of	  the	  contract	  a	  team	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  pay	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  circumstances.	  	  Contract	  length	  is	  also	  a	  suitable	  measure	  of	  risk	  because	  a	  longer	  contract	  means	  that	  a	  team	  will	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  player	  a	  high	  wage	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	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Future	  contract	  negotiations,	  where	  wages	  and	  other	  details	  can	  be	  adjusted,	  are	  delayed	  by	  long	  contracts.	  	  Independent	  variables	  that	  are	  tested	  include	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  of	  key	  statistics	  based	  on	  position,	  career	  average	  of	  the	  mentioned	  key	  statistics,	  games	  missed	  per	  year,	  age,	  and	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team.	  	  The	  data	  gathered	  for	  running	  backs	  and	  wide	  receivers	  show	  that	  the	  length	  of	  a	  contract	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  riskiness	  of	  a	  player	  while	  percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  cannot.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  conclusion,	  percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  did	  not	  correlate	  with	  the	  riskiness	  of	  a	  player	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  independent	  variables	  for	  any	  position.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  length	  of	  contract	  was	  able	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  variables.	  	  At	  both	  the	  running	  back	  and	  wide	  receiver	  position,	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  of	  yards	  per	  attempt,	  the	  best	  measure	  of	  statistical	  inconsistency,	  was	  statistically	  significant	  in	  the	  contract	  length	  regression.	  	  The	  negative	  coefficient	  supports	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  as	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  of	  yards	  per	  attempt	  increase,	  or	  statistical	  inconsistency	  increased,	  then	  a	  player	  would	  receive	  less	  years	  in	  their	  contract.	  	  A	  measure	  of	  risk	  due	  to	  health	  issues	  was	  also	  significant	  at	  both	  positions.	  	  For	  running	  backs,	  the	  games	  missed	  per	  year	  variable	  was	  statistically	  significant	  while	  for	  wide	  receivers	  the	  age	  variable	  was	  significant.	  	  With	  negative	  coefficients	  on	  these	  two	  variables,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  health	  or	  injury	  risk	  will	  lead	  to	  fewer	  years	  in	  a	  contract	  was	  supported.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  variables	  for	  career	  averages	  of	  key	  statistics	  remained	  significant	  in	  both	  regressions.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  a	  player	  with	  higher	  career	  averages	  will	  be	  granted	  more	  years	  in	  their	  contract	  even	  with	  their	  risk.	  	  The	  dummy	  variable	  for	  players	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team	  proved	  to	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be	  inconclusive	  or	  position	  specific.	  	  This	  variable	  was	  not	  significant	  in	  the	  running	  back	  regression,	  but	  was	  significant	  in	  the	  wide	  receiver	  regression.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  a	  running	  back	  coming	  from	  a	  new	  team	  involves	  additionally	  uncertainty	  that	  will	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  length	  of	  a	  contract.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  players	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team	  would	  receive	  shorter	  contracts	  was	  supported	  for	  wide	  receivers.	  	   The	  findings	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  bound	  to	  have	  future	  implications	  on	  contract	  negotiations.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  a	  contract	  seems	  to	  be	  random.	  	  Also,	  teams	  don’t	  seem	  to	  trade	  off	  between	  unguaranteed	  money	  and	  contract	  length	  when	  negotiating	  contracts.	  	  NFL	  teams	  should	  use	  unguaranteed	  money	  as	  a	  risk	  management	  tool,	  and	  offer	  more	  unguaranteed	  money	  to	  players	  who	  are	  riskier.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  NFL	  teams	  do	  offer	  shorter	  contracts	  to	  players	  that	  have	  been	  proven	  to	  be	  riskier	  based	  on	  past	  statistics.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  paper	  can	  be	  used	  as	  guidelines	  in	  future	  contract	  negotiations.	  	  Player	  salaries	  are	  on	  the	  rise,	  which	  brings	  additional	  importance	  to	  managing	  team	  risk.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  and	  contract	  length	  can	  be	  used	  in	  unison	  to	  attack	  the	  problem	  of	  risk	  in	  signing	  players.	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Chapter	  II:	  Background	  Information	  
	  
2.1	  	  Principal-­‐Agent	  Theory	  	   	  When	  a	  principal	  hires	  an	  agent	  to	  perform	  a	  task	  with	  uncertain	  outcomes,	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  contract	  will	  determine	  who	  bears	  the	  risk	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  The	  agreement	  between	  these	  two	  actors	  has	  been	  coined	  as	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship.	  	  In	  this	  model,	  there	  are	  two	  parties	  involved	  that	  are	  both	  self-­‐interested	  utility	  maximizing	  actors,	  a	  principal	  and	  an	  agent.	  	  When	  a	  principal	  hires	  an	  agent,	  the	  principal	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  Problems	  arise	  because	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  principal	  and	  the	  agent	  don’t	  completely	  align.	  	  The	  agent	  will	  act	  in	  his	  best	  interest	  and	  not	  that	  of	  the	  principal,	  who	  is	  facing	  all	  the	  risk.	  	  Professional	  sports	  have	  become	  a	  common	  way	  to	  study	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship,	  as	  data	  on	  performance	  of	  athletes	  and	  the	  contracts	  they	  receive	  is	  easily	  accessible.	  	  	  	   The	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  in	  sports	  is	  created	  when	  an	  organization,	  the	  principal,	  signs	  a	  free	  agent	  player,	  the	  agent,	  to	  a	  contract.	  	  Assuming	  that	  the	  player’s	  contracts	  detail	  a	  set	  wage,	  the	  player	  is	  not	  financially	  affected	  if	  the	  team	  wins	  or	  loses.	  	  However,	  the	  owner	  is	  significantly	  affected	  by	  wins	  and	  losses;	  one	  could	  expect	  the	  revenue	  of	  a	  losing	  team	  to	  significantly	  increase	  if	  that	  same	  team	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had	  a	  winning	  record.	  	  In	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  risk	  bearing,	  the	  owner	  should	  be	  interested	  in	  providing	  unguaranteed	  money	  to	  the	  players	  that	  they	  offer	  contracts	  to.	  	   	  In	  the	  NFL,	  unguaranteed	  money	  is	  already	  commonly	  used	  in	  player	  contracts.	  	  While	  the	  motivating	  power	  of	  incentives	  is	  easy	  to	  understand,	  this	  paper	  suggests	  the	  use	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  for	  an	  additional	  reason.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  can	  be	  used	  to	  protect	  teams	  when	  they	  take	  a	  chance	  and	  sign	  a	  risky	  player.	  	  Imagine	  if	  a	  team	  signed	  a	  risky	  player	  to	  a	  large	  contract,	  and	  this	  risky	  player	  turned	  out	  to	  have	  another	  year	  of	  bad	  performance.	  	  The	  team	  would	  not	  perform	  up	  to	  expectations	  because	  of	  the	  underperformance	  of	  the	  player,	  and	  the	  owner	  would	  see	  less	  profit	  as	  a	  result.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  risky	  player	  still	  gets	  paid	  the	  maximum	  value	  of	  his	  contract.	  	  If	  the	  risky	  player	  had	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  his	  contract,	  his	  underperformance	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  team	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  pay	  the	  full	  value	  of	  the	  contract.	  	  In	  this	  scenario,	  even	  though	  revenue	  would	  still	  be	  lower	  than	  expected,	  so	  would	  the	  cost	  of	  paying	  the	  players,	  so	  the	  team	  would	  not	  be	  harmed	  financially.	  	  Therefore,	  unguaranteed	  money	  attacks	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  relationship	  problem	  in	  sports	  in	  two	  ways,	  by	  motivating	  the	  players	  to	  increase	  their	  effort	  which	  will	  most	  likely	  increase	  their	  output,	  and	  by	  providing	  a	  safety	  net	  if	  the	  player’s	  effort	  and/or	  output	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  lower	  then	  what	  was	  hoped	  for.	  	  	  	  Free	  agent	  players	  in	  the	  NFL	  can	  be	  labeled	  as	  risky	  for	  any	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  It	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  player	  has	  had	  seasons	  where	  he	  proved	  himself	  to	  be	  an	  all-­‐star	  at	  his	  position.	  	  However,	  the	  same	  player	  may	  have	  had	  forgotten	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years	  where	  his	  performance	  was	  below	  average.	  	  Due	  to	  this	  type	  of	  volatile	  performance,	  this	  player	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  risky	  player	  with	  a	  tremendous	  upside.	  	  Also,	  players	  who	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  susceptible	  to	  injuries	  over	  their	  career	  will	  be	  labeled	  as	  risky.	  	  Teams	  will	  expect	  that	  these	  players	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  get	  injured	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  they	  can’t	  help	  the	  team	  if	  they	  are	  not	  on	  the	  field.	  	  Additionally,	  players	  may	  be	  considered	  risky	  simply	  because	  they	  are	  getting	  too	  old.	  	  Data	  on	  statistical	  performance,	  games	  missed	  due	  to	  injury,	  and	  age	  is	  available	  to	  a	  team	  who	  is	  considering	  signing	  a	  player.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  try	  to	  capture	  the	  riskiness	  of	  a	  player,	  an	  important	  component	  when	  negotiating	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  contract.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  should	  most	  likely	  be	  included	  in	  contracts	  of	  players	  deemed	  to	  be	  high-­‐risk.	  
	  
	  
2.2	  	  Incentives	  
	  
	   The	  stage	  is	  set	  for	  organizations	  to	  provide	  unguaranteed	  money	  for	  players	  so	  they	  act	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  team.	  	  Previous	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  unguaranteed	  money	  for	  the	  incentive	  that	  it	  provides,	  but	  not	  its	  relationship	  with	  risk.	  	  Teams	  now	  need	  to	  find	  incentives	  that	  are	  efficient	  at	  accomplishing	  the	  goal	  of	  aligning	  interests.	  	  Sports	  economists	  have	  different	  theories	  on	  what	  types	  of	  incentives	  should	  be	  used.	  	  According	  to	  Huebeck	  and	  Scheuer	  (2002),	  the	  ideal	  incentive	  would	  be	  based	  on	  individual	  effort	  as	  opposed	  to	  individual	  performance	  or	  statistics.	  However,	  effort	  is	  subjective	  and	  requires	  the	  organization	  to	  closely	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monitor	  the	  effort	  of	  players	  in	  practices	  and	  games.	  	  In	  the	  NFL,	  there	  are	  many	  coaches	  in	  the	  staff	  of	  a	  given	  team,	  so	  one	  could	  assume	  that	  monitoring	  is	  more	  or	  less	  possible.	  	  Players	  who	  prove	  to	  put	  in	  the	  most	  effort	  compared	  to	  other	  players	  at	  their	  position	  will	  be	  rewarded	  with	  additional	  playing	  time.	  	  With	  the	  additional	  playing	  time,	  players	  will	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  higher	  statistics	  and	  earn	  incentive	  bonuses	  if	  they	  are	  included	  in	  their	  contract.	  	  The	  authors	  refer	  to	  this	  situation	  where	  players	  are	  rewarded	  for	  their	  effort	  as	  a	  tournament-­‐style	  incentive,	  because	  players	  are	  competing	  against	  each	  other	  to	  win	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  coaching	  staff.	  	  In	  general,	  the	  authors	  believe	  that	  performance	  is	  not	  well	  correlated	  with	  effort.	  	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  close	  monitoring	  of	  NFL	  organizations	  create	  the	  situation	  where	  increased	  effort	  will	  lead	  to	  increased	  statistical	  performance.	  	  Therefore,	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  NFL,	  individual	  statistical	  output	  will	  be	  a	  suitable	  measure	  as	  it	  is	  closely	  correlated	  to	  effort.	  	  	  	   Heubeck	  and	  Scheuer	  (2002)	  also	  analyze	  incentives	  that	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  team	  as	  a	  whole,	  not	  individual	  statistics.	  	  In	  some	  incentive	  clauses,	  a	  player	  can	  receive	  more	  pay	  if	  the	  team	  achieves	  a	  certain	  win	  total	  or	  reaches	  the	  playoffs.	  	  The	  authors	  do	  not	  support	  this	  type	  of	  incentive,	  because	  a	  single	  player’s	  effort	  actually	  has	  a	  minimal	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  game	  in	  team	  sports.	  	  A	  team	  can	  win	  the	  game	  even	  if	  the	  player	  in	  question	  slacks	  off	  and	  has	  a	  bad	  performance,	  but	  he	  will	  be	  rewarded	  none-­‐the-­‐less.	  	  Despite	  this	  opinion,	  team	  performance	  based	  incentives	  are	  used	  in	  NFL	  contracts	  as	  a	  risk	  transfer	  strategy.	  	  If	  teams	  experience	  success	  then	  they	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  their	  players	  more	  due	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to	  high	  revenues,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  determine	  that	  certain	  players	  had	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  team’s	  success.	  	  	  
	  
2.3	  	  Collective	  Bargaining	  Agreements	  	  	   Conclusions	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  incentives	  give	  teams	  an	  idea	  of	  what	  types	  of	  contracts	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  offer.	  	  Teams	  can	  piece	  together	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  contract	  to	  ensure	  they	  are	  offering	  attractive	  deals	  while	  managing	  risk.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  rules	  and	  regulations	  set	  forth	  that	  restrict	  the	  way	  these	  contracts	  can	  be	  structured.	  	  Some	  rules	  and	  regulations	  will	  have	  implications	  on	  what	  players	  are	  included	  in	  the	  data	  set	  later	  on.	  These	  rules	  and	  regulations	  are	  negotiated	  in	  Collective	  Bargaining	  Agreements	  (CBA’s)	  between	  the	  team	  owners	  and	  the	  NFL	  Player’s	  Association.	  	  The	  NFL	  player’s	  association,	  or	  the	  NFLPA,	  was	  created	  in	  1956	  to	  ensure	  proper	  representation	  of	  the	  player’s	  rights.1	  	  Collective	  Bargaining	  Agreements	  have	  different	  lengths,	  and	  as	  the	  expiration	  approaches,	  both	  parties	  need	  to	  come	  to	  agreements	  on	  new	  issues	  for	  a	  new	  deal	  to	  be	  made.	  	  In	  the	  event	  that	  an	  agreement	  cannot	  be	  made	  before	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  previous	  CBA,	  the	  league	  will	  enter	  in	  a	  lockout	  where	  the	  operations	  of	  organizations	  and	  their	  players	  are	  completely	  shut	  down.	  	  This	  occurred	  most	  recently	  in	  2011,	  although	  a	  new	  CBA	  was	  eventually	  agreed	  upon	  before	  any	  games	  were	  actually	  cancelled.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  these	  two	  parties,	  the	  NFL	  owners	  and	  the	  NFLPA,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  https://www.nflplayers.com/about-­‐us/	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the	  threat	  that	  is	  created	  by	  not	  reaching	  a	  CBA	  deal	  are	  the	  driving	  forces	  of	  the	  adaptation	  of	  NFL	  rules	  and	  regulations	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  league	  history.	  
	  
2.4	  	  Free	  Agency	  
	   	  The	  component	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  in	  the	  NFL	  that	  is	  most	  relevant	  to	  this	  paper	  is	  free	  agency.	  	  Free	  agency	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  players	  to	  shop	  around	  organizations	  in	  the	  NFL	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  the	  best	  possible	  deal	  for	  themselves.	  	  When	  a	  team	  decides	  to	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  contract,	  they	  must	  adhere	  to	  NFL	  rules	  regarding	  free	  agency.	  	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  NFL	  free	  agency	  system	  has	  forced	  teams	  to	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  as	  a	  precaution	  when	  signing	  players,	  something	  that	  they	  have	  not	  always	  had	  to	  do.	  	  Free	  agency	  began	  in	  the	  NFL	  in	  1989	  under	  a	  system	  known	  as	  Plan	  B	  free	  agency.2	  	  Under	  these	  guidelines,	  a	  team	  was	  permitted	  to	  preserve	  limited	  rights	  of	  no	  more	  then	  37	  players	  on	  their	  roster	  from	  the	  previous	  year.	  	  Under	  these	  limited	  rights,	  players	  would	  have	  to	  allow	  their	  previous	  team	  to	  sign	  them	  first	  before	  negotiating	  with	  other	  teams.	  	  The	  Plan	  B	  free	  agency	  system	  benefited	  the	  owners,	  as	  teams	  could	  keep	  their	  best	  players	  around	  with	  out	  having	  their	  wages	  driven	  up	  by	  bidding	  wars	  with	  other	  teams.	  	  It	  was	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  eight	  players	  sued	  the	  NFL	  in	  1992	  in	  US	  federal	  court	  claiming	  that	  Plan	  B	  free	  agency	  violated	  antitrust	  laws.	  	  The	  court	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  players	  forcing	  the	  league	  to	  search	  for	  a	  new	  free	  agency	  system.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_agent	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   A	  new	  system,	  simply	  Plan	  A	  free	  agency,	  became	  effective	  for	  the	  1993	  NFL	  season.	  	  Under	  this	  system,	  free	  agents	  are	  classified	  as	  either	  restricted	  or	  unrestricted	  free	  agents.3	  	  A	  player	  who	  has	  been	  in	  the	  league	  for	  less	  then	  three	  seasons	  is	  labeled	  as	  a	  restricted	  free	  agent	  and	  sees	  restrictions	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  players	  in	  the	  Plan	  B	  system.	  	  But	  after	  four	  seasons	  in	  the	  NFL,	  a	  player	  becomes	  an	  unrestricted	  free	  agent	  and	  can	  negotiate	  with	  any	  team	  as	  he	  pleases.	  	  Plan	  A	  free	  agency	  leads	  to	  bidding	  wars	  between	  teams	  competing	  for	  the	  best	  players	  that	  drive	  the	  wages	  of	  free	  agents	  up.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  team	  may	  have	  to	  offer	  more	  money	  then	  they	  are	  comfortable	  with	  to	  attract	  the	  best	  talent.	  	  Therefore,	  teams	  are	  facing	  serious	  risk	  under	  Plan	  A	  free	  agency	  when	  they	  commit	  millions	  of	  dollars	  to	  a	  player	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  deal	  and	  need	  tools	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  overpaying	  risky	  athletes.	  	  	  	   To	  compensate	  for	  increased	  rights	  of	  players,	  the	  NFL	  owners	  implemented	  a	  tool	  to	  delay	  a	  player	  from	  becoming	  an	  unrestricted	  free	  agent.	  	  Under	  current	  NFL	  rules,	  players	  can	  be	  “slapped”	  with	  a	  franchise	  tag	  as	  their	  contract	  expires.	  	  This	  franchise	  tagged	  player	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  a	  salary	  that	  equals	  the	  average	  of	  the	  five	  highest	  players	  in	  the	  league	  at	  his	  position	  or	  120%	  of	  his	  previous	  salary	  if	  higher.4	  	  In	  return,	  this	  player	  will	  remain	  on	  the	  team	  for	  one	  additional	  year	  without	  negotiation	  privileges.	  	  Franchise	  tags	  were	  seen	  as	  necessary	  to	  inhibit	  the	  movement	  of	  top	  players,	  especially	  from	  small-­‐market	  to	  large-­‐market	  teams.	  	  While	  a	  team	  only	  has	  one	  franchise	  tag	  a	  year,	  they	  can	  designate	  it	  to	  the	  same	  player	  multiple	  years	  in	  a	  row.	  	  Since	  the	  franchise	  tag	  sets	  clear	  guidelines	  for	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Football_League	  4	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franchise_tag	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guaranteed	  salary	  for	  the	  player,	  players	  who	  received	  tags	  did	  not	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  will	  be	  excluded	  from	  this	  analysis.	  	  
	  
2.5	  	  Salary	  Cap	  
	   	  	  	   The	  NFL	  salary	  cap	  is	  also	  crucial	  for	  this	  analysis	  because	  it	  forces	  teams	  to	  make	  decisions	  when	  considering	  free	  agents.	  	  The	  use	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  was	  again	  increased	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  with	  this	  rule	  regarding	  the	  payroll	  of	  a	  team.	  	  The	  salary	  cap	  was	  implemented	  in	  the	  NFL	  in	  1994	  due	  to	  the	  fear	  that	  small-­‐market	  teams	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  their	  best	  players	  because	  of	  free	  agency	  and	  remain	  competitive	  in	  the	  league.5	  	  With	  competitive	  balance	  in	  mind,	  the	  salary	  cap	  was	  put	  into	  place.	  	  The	  NFL	  uses	  a	  “hard”	  salary	  cap,	  meaning	  a	  team’s	  payroll,	  or	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  money	  it	  is	  due	  to	  pay	  to	  its	  players	  in	  a	  year,	  cannot	  exceed	  a	  predetermined	  value.	  	  Teams	  could	  no	  longer	  attract	  top	  talent	  simply	  by	  offering	  the	  highest	  base	  salary,	  as	  they	  would	  need	  to	  have	  enough	  cap	  room	  to	  sign	  an	  entire	  roster.	  	  With	  the	  salary	  cap	  in	  place,	  once	  a	  team	  offers	  to	  pay	  a	  risky	  player	  a	  high	  salary	  for	  multiple	  years,	  they	  cannot	  then	  sign	  someone	  else	  to	  replace	  them	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  money	  the	  owner	  is	  willing	  to	  pay.	  	  The	  use	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  was	  adapted	  to	  ensure	  that	  every	  dollar	  spent	  would	  be	  worth	  it	  and	  also	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  strategically	  alter	  the	  “cap	  hit”	  involved	  when	  signing	  a	  player	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  contract.	  	  The	  cap	  hit	  is	  how	  much	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  player	  adds	  to	  the	  total	  value	  of	  the	  team’s	  payroll,	  and	  the	  league	  has	  set	  forth	  clear	  rules	  on	  how	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salary_cap	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are	  calculated.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  in	  a	  contract	  will	  allow	  teams	  to	  avoid	  significant	  cap	  hits	  in	  the	  future	  if	  the	  player	  is	  deemed	  not	  worth	  his	  wage.	  	  	   The	  salary	  cap	  changed	  the	  way	  contracts	  would	  be	  structured	  forever.	  	  Teams	  were	  forced	  to	  consider	  trade-­‐off	  strategies	  to	  strategically	  manage	  the	  cap	  hits	  of	  players	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  contract.	  	  Teams	  started	  negotiated	  a	  value	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  as	  one	  trade-­‐off	  strategy.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  ensured	  that	  a	  team	  will	  end	  up	  paying	  based	  on	  the	  performance	  they	  get	  from	  the	  player	  in	  the	  future.	  	  A	  player	  on	  a	  long-­‐term	  contract	  who	  underperforms	  can	  get	  cut	  before	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  they	  would	  forfeit	  the	  negotiated	  percentage	  of	  unguaranteed	  money.	  	  Additionally,	  contracts	  started	  to	  include	  various	  types	  of	  “likely	  to	  be	  met”	  and	  “unlikely	  to	  be	  met”	  incentives,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  was	  not	  included	  in	  cap	  hit	  calculation.	  	  If	  players	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  incentives	  and	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  their	  contracts,	  teams	  could	  offer	  them	  shorter	  contracts	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  risk.	  	  The	  measures	  to	  manage	  risk	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  and	  contract	  length	  will	  both	  be	  considered	  in	  this	  analysis.	  	  	  
	  
2.6	  	  Revenue	  Sharing	  	  	   The	  revenue	  sharing	  guidelines	  in	  the	  NFL	  also	  have	  significant	  implications	  on	  this	  study.	  	  One	  of	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  of	  sports	  economics	  including	  this	  study	  is	  that	  if	  a	  team	  performs	  better	  then	  they	  will	  increase	  their	  revenue.	  	  The	  correlation	  between	  team	  performance	  and	  revenue	  is	  limited	  in	  the	  NFL	  due	  to	  revenue	  sharing.	  	  While	  revenue	  sharing	  is	  good	  for	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  harms	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some	  teams.	  	  In	  the	  NFL,	  the	  league	  negotiates	  a	  television	  deal	  instead	  of	  teams	  negotiating	  individually,	  and	  the	  television	  revenue	  is	  equally	  distributed	  among	  the	  teams	  in	  the	  league.	  	  In	  other	  sports,	  the	  league	  negotiates	  a	  deal	  for	  only	  part	  of	  the	  schedule,	  and	  teams	  can	  individually	  negotiate	  their	  own	  deals	  for	  the	  remaining	  portion	  of	  the	  games.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  large	  market	  NFL	  teams	  that	  would	  make	  enormous	  sums	  of	  money	  if	  they	  negotiated	  their	  own	  deal	  are	  forced	  to	  accept	  significantly	  less.	  	  About	  2/3	  of	  the	  NFL’s	  revenue	  comes	  from	  their	  negotiated	  television	  deal.6	  	  Additionally,	  the	  revenue	  generated	  from	  ticket	  sales	  is	  split	  60/40	  with	  the	  home	  team	  only	  getting	  60%.	  	  Weak-­‐drawing	  teams	  typically	  have	  low	  ticket-­‐sales	  revenues,	  but	  benefit	  greatly	  when	  a	  large-­‐market	  team	  comes	  to	  play	  in	  their	  city.	  	   The	  consequences	  of	  revenue	  sharing	  schemes	  like	  the	  ones	  mentioned	  above	  are	  that	  owners	  cannot	  freely	  act	  to	  maximize	  revenue.	  	  Generally,	  there	  is	  less	  incentive	  for	  NFL	  teams	  to	  win	  compared	  to	  leagues	  without	  revenue	  sharing	  because	  the	  marginal	  revenue	  of	  an	  additional	  win	  is	  decreased.	  	  The	  financial	  difference	  between	  having	  a	  winning	  season	  compared	  to	  a	  losing	  season	  is	  significantly	  less	  then	  is	  would	  be	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  revenue	  sharing.	  	  None-­‐the-­‐less,	  NFL	  teams	  are	  still	  focused	  on	  win	  maximization,	  and	  their	  success	  relies	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  players	  they	  sign.	  	  
	  
2.7	  	  Examples	  of	  NFL	  Player	  Incentives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://football.calsci.com/SalaryCap.html	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   Unguaranteed	  money	  is	  very	  common	  in	  NFL	  player	  contracts	  today.	  	  In	  a	  study	  comparing	  the	  use	  of	  incentives	  in	  contracts	  across	  all	  major	  sports,	  Heubeck	  and	  Scheuer	  (2002)	  found	  that	  roughly	  65-­‐75%	  of	  NFL	  players	  receive	  payments	  that	  are	  based	  on	  individual	  performance.	  	  Other	  forms	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  may	  include	  payments	  based	  on	  team	  performance.	  	  Pay	  tied	  to	  team	  performance	  is	  a	  bad	  incentive	  but	  a	  great	  way	  to	  transfer	  risk	  to	  players.	  	  NFL	  organizations	  have	  branched	  out	  to	  use	  more	  and	  more	  types	  of	  incentives.	  	  The	  CBA	  also	  details	  exactly	  what	  types	  of	  incentives	  can	  be	  used	  in	  NFL	  contracts.	  	  Incentives	  that	  are	  common	  include	  work	  out	  bonuses,	  for	  completing	  a	  work	  out	  regimen	  in	  the	  offseason,	  and	  roster	  bonuses,	  for	  making	  the	  team	  in	  a	  certain	  year.	  	  Additionally,	  incentives	  can	  be	  based	  on	  individual	  accomplishments	  or	  awards.	  	  Incentives	  under	  this	  category	  can	  involve	  rushing	  for	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  yards	  in	  a	  season	  or	  being	  selected	  to	  the	  Pro	  Bowl,	  the	  NFL	  version	  of	  an	  all-­‐star	  game.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  quarterback	  could	  receive	  a	  bonus	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  if	  his	  team	  earns	  a	  playoff	  spot.	  	  	  	   Looking	  at	  the	  details	  of	  an	  actual	  NFL	  contract	  can	  help	  understand	  the	  use	  of	  unguaranteed	  money,	  contract	  length,	  other	  incentives,	  and	  cap	  hits	  in	  the	  NFL.	  	  Marshawn	  Lynch,	  a	  running	  back	  for	  the	  Seattle	  Seahawks,	  signed	  a	  new	  contract	  with	  his	  team	  after	  the	  2011	  season.	  	  The	  contract	  is	  worth	  $31	  million	  dollars	  over	  four	  years,	  but	  only	  $17	  million	  is	  guaranteed.7	  	  The	  guaranteed	  portion	  consists	  of	  a	  $6	  million	  dollar	  signing	  bonus	  and	  the	  $11	  million	  dollars	  that	  is	  his	  first	  and	  second	  year	  salaries	  ($4	  million	  and	  $7	  million	  respectively).	  	  This	  means,	  Lynch’s	  third	  and	  fourth	  year	  base	  salaries	  ($5	  and	  $5.5	  million	  respectively)	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  http://www.rotoworld.com/player/nfl/4186/marshawn-­‐lynch	  
	   16	  
unguaranteed,	  and	  if	  he	  were	  to	  get	  cut,	  he	  would	  miss	  out	  on	  significant	  potential	  pay.	  	  Other	  incentives	  within	  the	  contract	  include	  $1	  million	  bonuses	  for	  1,500	  rushing-­‐yard	  seasons	  in	  two	  of	  the	  years	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  $2.5	  million	  worth	  of	  per-­‐game	  roster	  bonuses	  in	  the	  final	  two	  years.	  	  	  	   Considering	  the	  implications	  on	  Lynch’s	  cap	  hits	  through	  the	  course	  of	  his	  deal	  will	  help	  understand	  the	  reasoned	  for	  including	  the	  mentioned	  unguaranteed	  money	  and	  incentives	  in	  the	  contract.	  	  Per	  NFL	  rules,	  the	  signing	  bonus,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  paid	  directly	  upon	  signing	  of	  the	  contract,	  is	  prorated	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  contract.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  $6	  million	  dollar	  signing	  bonus	  will	  add	  $1.5	  million	  to	  the	  cap	  hit	  calculation	  in	  each	  year.8	  	  In	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  contract,	  the	  2012	  season,	  Lynch’s	  contract	  comes	  with	  a	  $5.5	  million	  cap	  hit,	  including	  the	  $4	  million	  base	  plus	  $1.5	  prorated	  signing	  bonus.	  	  Exhibit	  1	  shows	  how	  the	  cap	  hit	  of	  Lynch’s	  contract	  changes	  over	  the	  four	  years.	  
Exhibit	  1:	  Marhsawn	  Lynch’s	  Contract	  Cap	  Hit	  Calculation	  (in	  $millions)	  





2012	   4	   1.5	   0	   5.5	  
2013	   7	   1.5	   0	   8.5	  
2014	   5	   1.5	   .5	   7	  
2015	   5.5	   1.5	   2	   9	  Source:	  www.spotrac.com	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/seattle-­‐seahawks/marshawn-­‐lynch/	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   There	  are	  a	  few	  things	  worth	  noting	  from	  Exhibit	  1.	  	  First,	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  four	  cap	  hits	  is	  $30	  million	  even	  though	  the	  contract	  can	  potentially	  be	  worth	  $31	  million.	  	  Even	  though	  a	  $1	  million	  difference	  seems	  modest	  considering	  the	  total	  value,	  the	  Seahawks	  organization	  used	  incentives,	  specifically	  ones	  classified	  as	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  met,	  to	  dampen	  the	  impact	  of	  signing	  Lynch	  on	  their	  salary	  cap.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  cap	  hits	  in	  the	  final	  two	  years	  of	  the	  contract	  are	  significantly	  higher	  then	  the	  first	  year	  cap	  hit.	  	  If	  the	  team	  decided	  that	  Lynch	  was	  not	  worth	  the	  contract	  after	  his	  second	  year,	  the	  Seahawks	  could	  cut	  Lynch	  and	  avoid	  the	  significant	  $7	  and	  $9	  million	  dollar	  hits	  on	  their	  salary	  cap.	  	  From	  Lynch’s	  perspective,	  there	  is	  $13	  million	  dollars	  up	  for	  grabs	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  his	  contract,	  and	  he	  obviously	  would	  want	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  earn	  a	  spot	  on	  the	  team	  and	  receive	  that	  pay.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  Lynch’s	  contract,	  which	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  escalates	  in	  terms	  of	  cap	  hit,	  is	  not	  at	  all	  rare	  across	  the	  NFL.	  	  The	  Seahawks	  organization	  used	  unguaranteed	  money	  strategically	  in	  certain	  years	  to	  help	  navigate	  the	  salary	  cap.	  	  Perhaps	  they	  knew	  they	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  cap	  space	  in	  the	  final	  three	  years	  but	  not	  so	  much	  in	  2012,	  and	  crafted	  a	  deal	  that	  would	  attract	  and	  motivate	  Lynch	  while	  also	  allowing	  the	  team	  to	  stay	  below	  the	  salary	  cap.	  	  
	  
2.8	  	  Shirking	  Theory	  	  	   Although	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  consider	  whether	  unguaranteed	  money	  affects	  player	  performance	  after	  the	  contract	  is	  signed,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  analyzing	  incentive	  contracts	  in	  professional	  sports	  centers	  around	  the	  theory	  of	  shirking.	  	  Shirking	  is	  when	  a	  player	  decreases	  his	  effort	  after	  signing	  a	  big	  long-­‐term	  contract	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because	  he	  knows	  he	  is	  getting	  paid	  regardless	  of	  performance	  and	  that	  the	  next	  round	  of	  contract	  negotiations	  are	  far	  off	  in	  the	  future.	  	  The	  media	  commonly	  speculates	  that	  athletes,	  particularly	  high	  profile	  stars,	  are	  guilty	  of	  shirking	  behavior.	  	  Frustrated	  fans	  and	  media	  members	  alike	  figure	  that	  the	  athletes	  worked	  hard	  in	  recent	  years	  with	  the	  hopes	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  guaranteed	  contract.	  	  If	  such	  speculation	  is	  correct,	  incentives	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  logical	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  shirking	  in	  sports.	  	  Sports	  economists	  use	  many	  different	  models	  to	  try	  to	  search	  for	  evidence	  of	  shirking,	  as	  we	  will	  se	  later	  on.	  	  Such	  economists	  would	  compare	  measures	  of	  performance	  of	  athletes	  from	  before	  and	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  big,	  long-­‐term	  contract.	  	  Economists	  studying	  shirking	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  to	  explain	  declines	  in	  performance.	  	  	   This	  paper	  centers	  around	  a	  different,	  but	  not	  completely	  opposite,	  theory	  regarding	  performance	  and	  contracts.	  	  In	  essence,	  these	  players	  that	  some	  may	  label	  as	  shirkers	  do	  not	  intentionally	  decrease	  their	  effort	  after	  signing	  big,	  long-­‐term	  contracts.	  	  Instead,	  these	  players	  were	  actually	  riskier	  assets	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  teams	  failed	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	  such	  risk	  when	  working	  out	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract.	  	  Bad	  performance	  that	  could	  come	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  contract	  is	  this	  risk	  coming	  to	  the	  surface.	  	  Chances	  are,	  the	  player	  in	  question	  had	  just	  completed	  one	  or	  two	  years	  where	  they	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  all-­‐star	  caliber	  player.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  organizations	  to	  avoid	  being	  nearsighted,	  as	  there	  may	  have	  also	  been	  years	  where	  this	  same	  player	  was	  just	  average	  or	  even	  worse.	  	  From	  a	  team’s	  perspective,	  they	  should	  be	  uncertain	  of	  what	  quality	  of	  performance	  they	  are	  going	  to	  get	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Since	  an	  organization’s	  well	  being	  depends	  on	  the	  performance	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of	  their	  top	  players,	  they	  are	  at	  risk.	  	  This	  theory	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  a	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  could	  exist,	  although	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  incentives	  and	  unguaranteed	  money	  specifically	  in	  the	  NFL	  should	  eliminate	  shirking.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  NFL	  proves	  to	  be	  a	  sufficient	  setting	  to	  explore	  this	  theory	  of	  player	  riskiness.	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  unguaranteed	  money	  can	  be	  used	  to	  motivate	  players,	  but	  this	  unguaranteed	  money	  should	  be	  focused	  more	  on	  athletes	  who	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  riskier.	  	  Perhaps	  these	  players	  are	  inconsistent,	  prone	  to	  injury,	  or	  simply	  too	  old.	  	  None	  the	  less,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  see	  if	  organizations	  in	  the	  NFL	  are	  finding	  risk	  in	  the	  data	  of	  the	  player	  they	  are	  considering	  signing	  and	  appropriately	  providing	  themselves	  a	  safety	  net	  in	  response.	  	  Incentives,	  unguaranteed	  money,	  and	  shorter	  contracts	  are	  tools	  that	  need	  to	  be	  properly	  used	  to	  transfer	  risk	  to	  the	  players.	  	  	  	  	  The	  speculation	  that	  sports	  organizations	  are	  too	  near	  sighted	  has	  been	  studied	  before	  in	  different	  major	  sports.	  	  Sports	  economists	  are	  interested	  to	  see	  if	  teams	  offer	  too	  much	  money	  or	  too	  long	  of	  contracts	  to	  players	  coming	  off	  years	  of	  high	  performance.	  	  Healy	  (2008)	  attempted	  to	  uncover	  if	  organizations	  in	  Major	  League	  Baseball	  have	  “short-­‐term	  memories”.	  	  Healy	  exerts	  that	  players	  could	  have	  had	  great	  years	  before	  signing	  a	  contract	  either	  because	  of	  “luck”	  or	  intentionally	  increasing	  effort	  with	  contract	  negotiations	  in	  mind.	  	  Using	  suitable	  measures	  of	  statistical	  performance,	  which	  is	  very	  easy	  in	  the	  sport	  of	  baseball,	  Healy	  looked	  at	  the	  variations	  of	  performance	  of	  players	  leading	  up	  to	  contract	  years.	  	  Using	  wage	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable,	  Healy	  used	  a	  regression	  to	  estimate	  the	  effect	  of	  recent	  performance	  on	  wage	  versus	  the	  effect	  of	  past	  performance	  on	  wage.	  	  The	  results	  indicated	  that	  MLB	  teams	  infer	  too	  much	  from	  performance	  in	  the	  most	  recent	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season	  relative	  to	  performance	  from	  earlier	  seasons.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  teams	  make	  the	  mistake	  of	  spending	  resources	  on	  players	  who	  may	  have	  had	  only	  one	  great	  season,	  thereby	  being	  too	  near-­‐sighted.	  	  Although	  Healy’s	  study	  involves	  the	  MLB,	  it	  is	  very	  much	  related	  to	  this	  paper	  on	  the	  NFL.	  	  Even	  though	  Healy	  does	  not	  use	  the	  word	  “risk”	  very	  often,	  he	  is	  very	  much	  using	  a	  similar	  hypothesis.	  	  Risky	  players	  may	  have	  had	  a	  “lucky”	  season	  and	  earned	  long-­‐term	  guaranteed	  contracts	  in	  the	  MLB,	  and	  the	  performance	  after	  the	  fact	  did	  not	  live	  up	  to	  expectations.	  	  In	  economic	  terms,	  this	  underperformance	  is	  known	  as	  winner’s	  curse.	  	  Basically,	  the	  asset	  proved	  to	  be	  less	  valuable	  then	  the	  bidder	  anticipated.	  	  As	  Healy	  mentions,	  MLB	  teams	  were	  harmed	  by	  being	  too	  near-­‐sighted,	  or	  not	  identifying	  risk,	  and	  organizations	  in	  the	  NFL	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  make	  the	  same	  mistakes.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  evidence	  of	  shirking	  has	  been	  inconclusive	  across	  other	  major	  sports.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  results	  of	  such	  studies,	  an	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  a	  different	  theory	  should	  be	  taken.	  	  However,	  the	  models	  and	  assumptions	  used	  in	  shirking	  studies	  are	  very	  much	  related	  to	  this	  study	  on	  player	  riskiness	  and	  incentive	  contracts.	  	  Kahn	  (2000)	  tried	  to	  pinpoint	  moral	  hazard	  problems	  that	  result	  from	  players	  signing	  long-­‐term	  contracts.	  	  Similar	  to	  effects	  seen	  in	  the	  NFL,	  Kahn	  found	  that	  the	  addition	  of	  free	  agency	  brought	  about	  increased	  incidence	  of	  long-­‐term	  contracts.	  	  Again,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  competition	  between	  teams	  that	  comes	  from	  free	  agency	  leads	  teams	  to	  push	  the	  limits	  regarding	  offering	  long-­‐term	  guaranteed	  contracts.	  	  In	  bidding	  against	  one	  another,	  teams	  may	  unwillingly	  sign	  a	  risky	  player	  to	  a	  long-­‐term	  deal.	  	  Kahn	  uses	  data	  from	  past	  studies	  to	  compare	  MLB	  players	  on	  contracts	  of	  two	  years	  or	  less	  to	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those	  on	  contracts	  of	  three	  years	  or	  more.	  	  Data	  shows	  that	  before	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  new	  contract,	  players	  that	  ended	  up	  with	  contracts	  of	  three	  years	  or	  more	  were	  on	  average	  2	  years	  younger	  and	  had	  2.2	  less	  days	  per	  season	  of	  disability	  then	  those	  that	  ended	  up	  with	  contracts	  of	  two	  or	  less	  years.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  numbers	  show	  that	  the	  group	  of	  players	  who	  would	  receive	  long-­‐deals	  were	  actually	  less	  injury	  prone	  to	  this	  point	  in	  their	  career.	  	  However,	  after	  signing,	  long-­‐term	  contract	  players	  averaged	  12.6	  disable	  days	  per	  season	  compared	  to	  5.2	  for	  those	  on	  one	  or	  two	  year	  contracts.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Kahn	  concludes	  that	  a	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  that	  falls	  under	  the	  definition	  of	  shirking	  did	  exist	  in	  the	  MLB,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  given	  data	  set.	  	  Relating	  back	  to	  this	  study	  on	  the	  NFL,	  if	  football	  players	  are	  given	  long-­‐term	  guaranteed	  contracts	  then	  it	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  shirking	  would	  exist.	  	  However,	  the	  nature	  of	  current	  NFL	  contracts	  is	  such	  that	  if	  you	  don’t	  play,	  you	  don’t	  get	  paid.	  	  Therefore,	  shirking	  should	  not	  explain	  declines	  in	  performance	  in	  the	  NFL.	  A	  quick	  look	  into	  two	  studies	  that	  involve	  the	  National	  Basketball	  Association	  can	  help	  show	  the	  inconsistency	  in	  results	  of	  shirking	  theory.	  	  Stiroh	  (2007)	  uses	  a	  unique	  database	  of	  individual	  measures	  of	  performance,	  contract	  status,	  and	  compensation	  to	  analyze	  incentive	  effects	  of	  contracts	  in	  the	  NBA.	  	  Stiroh	  states	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  is	  both	  a	  good	  and	  bad	  incentive.	  	  Players	  will	  work	  hard	  to	  try	  to	  earn	  a	  long-­‐term	  contract,	  but	  once	  they	  have	  earned	  it,	  a	  reverse	  incentive	  is	  then	  created.	  	  Stiroh	  ran	  regressions	  using	  NBA	  contracts	  from	  the	  1980’s	  and	  1990’s,	  using	  past	  statistics	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  year	  in	  which	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  were	  signed.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  Stiroh	  found	  statistically	  significant	  evidence	  of	  above	  average	  performance	  before	  contract	  years	  followed	  by	  a	  below	  average	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performance	  after	  signing	  the	  contract.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Stiroh	  states	  that	  focusing	  on	  a	  single	  year	  of	  performance	  can	  be	  misleading	  and	  that	  shirking	  behavior	  did	  exist	  in	  the	  NBA.	  Berri	  and	  Krautmann	  (2006)	  used	  a	  different	  model	  to	  search	  for	  evidence	  of	  shirking	  in	  the	  NBA.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  authors	  were	  testing	  the	  incentive	  effects	  of	  guaranteed	  money	  in	  the	  NBA.	  	  Two	  commonly	  used	  measures	  of	  performance	  in	  the	  NBA	  were	  considered,	  and	  they	  were	  controlled	  for	  team	  strength	  and	  age.	  	  The	  authors	  included	  dummy	  variables	  for	  players	  with	  contracts	  of	  three	  years	  or	  more	  in	  length,	  players	  with	  less	  than	  two	  years	  in	  the	  league,	  and	  players	  with	  over	  twelve	  years’	  experience	  in	  the	  league.	  	  Using	  a	  general	  economist’s	  view	  of	  individual	  performance	  based	  on	  marginal	  product,	  the	  paper	  could	  not	  conclude	  evidence	  of	  shirking	  in	  the	  NBA.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Berri	  and	  Krautmann’s	  own	  “NBA	  model”	  of	  player	  productivity	  did	  show	  statistically	  significant	  evidence	  of	  shirking.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  Berri	  and	  Krautmann	  admit	  that	  the	  economic	  realities	  of	  professional	  sports	  make	  shirking	  unlikely	  and	  that	  the	  media	  frequently	  blows	  things	  out	  of	  proportion.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  although	  shirking	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  very	  possible	  behavior	  in	  principle	  in	  the	  NBA	  as	  well	  as	  all	  sports,	  actual	  statistical	  studies	  have	  led	  to	  mixed	  results.	  	  Results	  all	  depend	  on	  the	  many	  variations	  that	  economists	  have	  used	  in	  models,	  measures	  of	  performance,	  and	  other	  independent	  variables.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  offering	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  contracts,	  the	  NFL	  offers	  a	  sufficient	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  a	  different	  theory	  of	  player	  riskiness.	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Chapter	  III:	  Data,	  Model	  and	  Equation	  
	  
	   In	  order	  to	  see	  if	  the	  percentage	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  or	  length	  of	  contracts	  reflect	  how	  risky	  players	  are,	  players	  under	  contract	  for	  the	  start	  of	  the	  2012	  NFL	  season	  will	  be	  observed.	  	  A	  few	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  proper	  analysis	  is	  completed.	  	  First,	  only	  running	  backs	  and	  wide	  receivers	  will	  be	  included.	  	  Performance	  at	  these	  positions	  can	  adequately	  be	  measured	  by	  readily	  available	  statistics.	  	  Additionally,	  there	  are	  enough	  roster	  players	  per	  team	  to	  put	  together	  enough	  observations	  for	  regressions	  to	  be	  run.	  	  Players	  who	  are	  on	  the	  roster	  at	  these	  positions	  but	  are	  used	  primarily	  as	  special	  teams	  players	  will	  be	  excluded,	  as	  one	  can	  assume	  their	  salary	  is	  significantly	  affected	  by	  their	  special	  teams	  abilities	  that	  won’t	  be	  reflected	  as	  independent	  variables.	  	  In	  the	  NFL	  each	  position	  is	  paid	  to	  perform	  different	  tasks	  so	  statistics	  that	  capture	  the	  performance	  of	  players	  differs	  based	  on	  position.	  	  For	  example,	  running	  backs	  are	  paid	  to	  run	  the	  ball	  and	  wide	  receivers	  are	  paid	  to	  catch	  the	  ball.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  statistical	  measures,	  different	  regressions	  will	  be	  run	  for	  running	  backs	  and	  wide	  receivers.	  	  Secondly,	  players	  must	  not	  still	  be	  on	  their	  rookie	  contracts.	  	  This	  paper	  is	  considering	  if	  teams	  use	  past	  NFL	  data	  on	  players	  when	  drafting	  the	  details	  of	  contracts,	  but	  this	  past	  data	  does	  not	  exist	  for	  players	  out	  of	  college	  signing	  their	  first	  contract.	  	  Only	  college	  football	  performance	  is	  available,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  of	  how	  this	  performance	  will	  translate	  to	  the	  higher	  skill	  level	  in	  the	  NFL.	  	  Thirdly,	  the	  statistics	  will	  only	  be	  gathered	  from	  seasons	  completed	  prior	  to	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  contract.	  	  If	  a	  player	  signed	  a	  contract	  in	  2009	  then	  they	  have	  completed	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three	  seasons	  after	  the	  fact,	  but	  these	  statistics	  did	  not	  exist	  when	  contract	  negotiations	  were	  ongoing.	  	  Unlike	  in	  shirking	  studies,	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  consider	  performance	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  contract.	  	   One	  dependent	  variable	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  regressions	  is	  percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  (PMNG).	  	  This	  percentage	  will	  be	  calculated	  using	  the	  most	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  terms	  in	  a	  player’s	  contract.	  	  The	  formula	  for	  calculating	  PMNG	  is	  the	  amount	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  a	  contract	  divided	  by	  the	  maximum	  possible	  value.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  PMNG	  calculation	  for	  Marshawn	  Lynch’s	  contract	  would	  be	  $14	  million	  unguaranteed	  divided	  by	  $31	  million	  maximum	  value	  for	  a	  PMNG	  value	  of	  about	  0.45.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  best	  possible	  measure	  of	  the	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  a	  contract.	  	  However	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  capturing	  the	  unguaranteed	  money	  into	  an	  objective	  measure	  is	  complicated.	  	  It	  is	  not	  just	  the	  value	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  that	  matters,	  as	  the	  years	  that	  the	  salary	  is	  unguaranteed	  also	  matters.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  PMNG	  will	  be	  tested	  anyway	  given	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  alternatives.	  	  Also,	  years	  in	  contract	  length	  (CONTYRS),	  which	  is	  more	  objectively	  measured,	  will	  be	  compiled	  for	  all	  players.	  	  Contract	  data	  was	  compiled	  from	  rotoworld.com.	  	  A	  few	  different	  possible	  statistical	  measures	  provided	  by	  NFL	  data	  can	  be	  used	  to	  measure	  performance	  at	  different	  positions.	  	  For	  this	  study,	  statistics	  were	  compiled	  for	  touches	  per	  game,	  yards	  per	  attempt,	  and	  touchdowns	  per	  game.	  	  Touches	  consist	  of	  primarily	  rushes	  for	  running	  backs	  and	  receptions	  by	  receivers.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  touches	  are	  an	  adequate	  measure	  because	  those	  who	  are	  performing	  well	  will	  see	  more	  playing	  time	  and	  get	  more	  rushes	  or	  catches.	  	  However,	  for	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players	  who	  were	  backups	  to	  superstars	  and	  saw	  rare	  playing	  time	  before	  signing	  as	  a	  starter	  for	  a	  new	  team,	  touches	  are	  not	  a	  good	  measure.	  	  Touchdowns	  per	  game	  were	  included,	  as	  many	  players	  are	  paid	  for	  performance	  specifically	  in	  the	  end	  zone.	  	  Running	  backs	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  “goal	  line”	  backs	  just	  as	  wide	  receivers	  can	  be	  the	  go-­‐to	  man	  in	  the	  red	  zone.	  	  They	  are	  paid	  to	  finish	  off	  a	  drive	  but	  wont	  necessarily	  put	  up	  huge	  numbers	  in	  touches	  or	  yards.	  	  Yards	  per	  attempt,	  more	  specifically	  yards	  per	  rush	  for	  a	  running	  back	  and	  yards	  per	  catch	  for	  a	  wide	  receiver,	  shows	  how	  effective	  a	  player	  was	  when	  they	  did	  get	  the	  ball.	  	  Clearly,	  there	  are	  problems	  that	  arise	  with	  trying	  to	  define	  a	  player’s	  performance	  with	  a	  few	  statistical	  measures.	  	  All	  in	  all,	  yards	  per	  attempt	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  single	  best	  statistical	  measure	  of	  performance	  for	  running	  backs	  and	  wide	  receivers.	  	  In	  the	  event	  that	  touches	  per	  game	  and	  touchdowns	  per	  game	  prove	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  in	  the	  model,	  they	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  well.	  	  Obviously,	  NFL	  player	  statistics	  are	  available	  all	  over	  the	  web,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  were	  collected	  from	  rotoworld.com.	  	  To	  adapt	  these	  statistics	  into	  a	  risk	  measure	  of	  performance	  inconsistency,	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  for	  career	  statistics	  in	  all	  three	  categories	  will	  be	  calculated.	  	  The	  variables	  for	  the	  coefficients	  of	  variation	  for	  touches	  per	  game,	  yards	  per	  attempt,	  and	  touchdowns	  per	  game	  will	  be	  listed	  as	  VARTOUCH,	  VARYDSATT,	  and	  VARTD	  respectively.	  	  	  	   Alongside	  the	  data	  for	  player	  productivity,	  other	  variables	  will	  be	  collected	  as	  well.	  	  For	  each	  player,	  age	  (AGE)	  and	  number	  of	  completed	  seasons	  (SEASONS)	  will	  be	  collected	  as	  a	  possible	  measure	  of	  riskiness	  due	  to	  getting	  too	  old,	  or	  being	  too	  “seasoned”	  as	  some	  experts	  would	  say.	  	  Multicollinearity	  exists	  between	  these	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mentioned	  variables,	  so	  one	  or	  the	  other	  may	  exist	  in	  the	  final	  equation,	  but	  not	  both.	  	  Also	  note	  that	  a	  player’s	  age	  and	  seasons	  completed	  would	  be	  at	  the	  time	  that	  their	  most	  recent	  contract	  was	  signed.	  	  Average	  games	  missed	  per	  year	  prior	  to	  signing	  the	  contract	  (MISSED)	  will	  be	  collected	  as	  well	  to	  capture	  the	  injury	  risk	  of	  the	  players.	  	  Additionally,	  players	  who	  missed	  full	  years	  due	  to	  injury	  (YEARMISSED)	  or	  temporary	  retirement	  prior	  to	  signing	  their	  contract	  will	  be	  recorded	  and	  considered	  as	  a	  dummy	  variable	  in	  the	  regression.	  	  Players	  under	  this	  category	  may	  come	  with	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  or	  risk.	  	  	  	   Other	  independent	  variables	  that	  cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  measures	  of	  risk	  but	  may	  affect	  the	  unguaranteed	  money	  or	  length	  of	  contract	  that	  a	  player	  receives	  will	  be	  compiled	  as	  well.	  	  The	  career	  average	  of	  the	  three	  statistical	  categories	  mentioned	  above	  will	  be	  calculated,	  AVGTOUCH,	  AVGYDSATT,	  and	  AVGTD	  for	  touches	  per	  game,	  yards	  per	  attempt,	  and	  touchdowns	  per	  game	  respectively.	  	  These	  variables	  will	  control	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  players	  who	  prove	  to	  put	  up	  the	  highest	  career	  averages	  may	  receive	  more	  guaranteed	  money	  or	  years	  of	  contract	  then	  their	  riskiness	  measures	  indicate.	  	  Lastly,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  will	  be	  considered	  for	  players	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team	  (NEWTEAM).	  	  A	  free	  agent	  may	  come	  with	  more	  uncertainty	  from	  a	  team	  that	  has	  not	  become	  familiar	  with	  them	  or	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  monitor	  them	  closely.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  tables	  in	  Exhibits	  2a	  and	  2b	  show	  the	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  the	  data	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  for	  running	  backs	  and	  wide	  receivers.	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Exhibit	  2a:	  Means	  and	  Standard	  Deviations	  of	  Data	  Set	  for	  Running	  Backs	  	   Running	  Backs	  (33	  Observations)	  
Variable	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  PMNG	   54.99	   24.10	  CONTYRS	   3.67	   1.86	  VARTOUCH	   0.41	   0.21	  VARYDSATT	   0.17	   0.13	  VARTD	   0.67	   0.34	  AVGTOUCH	   13.3	   5.49	  AVGYDSATT	   4.48	   0.53	  AVGTD	   0.43	   0.22	  AGE	   26.52	   1.94	  SEASONS	   4.45	   1.23	  MISSED	   1.99	   1.44	  	  	   Exhibit	  2b:	  Means	  and	  Standard	  Deviations	  of	  Data	  Set	  for	  Wide	  Receivers	  	   Wide	  Receivers	  (43	  Observations)	  
Variable	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  PMNG	   59.49	   13.54	  CONTYRS	   4.19	   1.76	  VARTOUCH	   0.36	   0.19	  VARYDSATT	   0.14	   0.07	  VARTD	   0.58	   0.31	  AVGTOUCH	   3.56	   1.24	  AVGYDSATT	   13.9	   2.40	  AVGTD	   0.31	   0.16	  AGE	   27.67	   2.93	  SEASONS	   5.60	   2.61	  MISSED	   1.83	   1.42	  
	  
	   Additionally,	  of	  the	  33	  running	  backs	  and	  43	  wide	  receivers	  there	  are	  12	  and	  17	  players	  respectively	  who	  signed	  with	  a	  new	  team.	  	  Only	  one	  wide	  receiver	  and	  zero	  running	  backs	  had	  missed	  entire	  years	  before	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  contract.	  	  Due	  to	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a	  lack	  of	  observations,	  the	  YEARMISSED	  variable	  will	  not	  be	  included	  at	  all	  in	  the	  regressions.	  	  	  	   Continuing	  with	  the	  example	  of	  Marshawn	  Lynch	  will	  help	  put	  perspective	  on	  how	  the	  independent	  variables	  should	  affect	  PMNG	  or	  CONTYRS.	  	  Exhibit	  3	  shows	  the	  variables	  that	  were	  gathered	  for	  Marshawn	  Lynch	  and	  if	  they	  are	  greater	  than	  or	  less	  than	  the	  averages	  of	  running	  backs	  in	  the	  data.	  	  	  	   Exhibit	  3:	  Marshawn	  Lynch	  Comparison	  to	  Running	  Back	  Data	  
Variable	   Running	  Back	  
Data	  Average	  
Marshawn	  Lynch	   Greater	  or	  Less	  
Than	  Average	  PMNG	   54.99	   45.16	   Less	  	  CONTYRS	   3.67	   4	   Greater	  VARTOUCH	   0.41	   0.26	   Less	  VARYDSATT	   0.17	   0.06	   Less	  VARTD	   0.67	   0.52	   Less	  AVGTOUCH	   13.3	   18.04	   Greater	  AVGYDSATT	   4.48	   3.94	   Less	  AVGTD	   0.43	   0.51	   Greater	  AGE	   26.52	   25	   Less	  SEASONS	   4.45	   5	   Greater	  MISSED	   1.99	   1.6	   Less	  	   Simply	  by	  looking	  at	  Exhibit	  3,	  one	  can	  presume	  that	  Marshawn	  Lynch	  is	  relatively	  less	  risky	  in	  terms	  of	  performance	  inconsistency	  and	  injury	  risk.	  	  All	  of	  his	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  variables	  are	  less	  than	  the	  average	  of	  the	  running	  back	  data	  set.	  	  Additionally,	  he	  is	  younger	  and	  has	  missed	  less	  games	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  career	  compared	  to	  running	  back	  averages.	  	  With	  regards	  to	  career	  averages,	  there	  is	  mixed	  results.	  	  Lynch	  actually	  averages	  less	  career	  yards	  per	  attempt	  than	  the	  average	  running	  back	  but	  more	  touches	  per	  game	  and	  touchdowns	  per	  game.	  	  Lastly,	  notice	  that	  Lynch	  received	  less	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  terms	  of	  percentage	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of	  total	  value	  and	  a	  longer	  contract	  then	  the	  average	  running	  back.	  	  Overall,	  Lynch	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  relatively	  low	  risk	  in	  terms	  of	  statistical	  performance	  inconsistency	  and	  susceptibility	  to	  injury.	  	  His	  career	  averages	  of	  the	  three	  statistical	  averages	  vary,	  but	  all	  in	  all	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  he	  has	  performed	  close	  to	  average	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  running	  backs.	  	  This	  paper	  would	  assume	  that	  the	  result	  for	  Lynch	  would	  be	  relatively	  more	  guaranteed	  money	  and	  a	  relatively	  longer	  contract.	  	  Given	  that	  Lynch’s	  PMNG	  variable	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  running	  back	  average	  and	  his	  CONTYRS	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  running	  back	  average,	  the	  assumption	  holds	  in	  this	  specific	  observation.	  	  	  	  Regressions	  will	  be	  run	  to	  see	  if	  similar	  results	  are	  evident	  throughout	  the	  entire	  data	  set.	  	  The	  regression	  will	  estimate	  coefficients	  for	  the	  following	  equations	  at	  both	  positions.	  	  These	  estimated	  equations	  come	  from	  the	  economic	  model	  of	  contract	  negotiations.	  	  While	  all	  of	  the	  listed	  independent	  variables	  may	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  final	  equation,	  they	  will	  be	  used	  initially	  in	  regressions.	  	  	  
PMNG	  =	  ß0	  	  +	  ß1NEWTEAM	  +	  ß2VARTOUCH	  +	  ß3VARYDSATT	  +	  ß4VARTD	  +	  	  ß5AVGTOUCH	  +	  ß6AVGYDSATT	  +	  ß7AVGTD	  +	  ß8MISSED	  +	  ß9AGE	  	  	  	  CONTYRS	  =	  ß0	  	  +	  ß1NEWTEAM	  +	  ß2VARTOUCH	  +	  ß3VARYDSATT	  +	  ß4VARTD	  +	  	  ß5AVGTOUCH	  +	  ß6AVGYDSATT	  +	  ß7AVGTD	  +	  ß8MISSED	  +	  ß9AGE	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Chapter	  IV:	  Empirical	  Results:	  
	  	   The	  empirical	  results	  should	  demonstrate	  that	  riskier	  players	  get	  shorter	  contracts	  and	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  unguaranteed	  money.	  	  If	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  correct,	  the	  coefficients	  of	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  variables	  should	  be	  negative,	  as	  a	  higher	  variation	  means	  more	  inconsistency	  risk	  and	  therefore	  less	  contract	  years	  or	  more	  unguaranteed	  money.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  coefficients	  of	  the	  risk	  variables	  of	  MISSED,	  AGE,	  and/or	  SEASONS	  should	  be	  negative,	  demonstrating	  that	  more	  injury	  risk	  will	  lead	  to	  shorter	  contracts	  and	  more	  unguaranteed	  money.	  	  The	  coefficients	  of	  the	  career	  average	  statistic	  variables	  should	  be	  positive,	  because	  a	  higher	  average	  performance	  should	  lead	  to	  more	  contract	  years	  and	  guaranteed	  money.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  NEWTEAM	  dummy	  variable	  should	  be	  negative,	  showing	  that	  players	  receive	  less	  contract	  years	  and	  more	  unguaranteed	  money	  when	  coming	  from	  a	  new	  team	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  uncertainty.	  	  Regressions	  can	  be	  run	  in	  attempt	  to	  see	  if	  these	  hypotheses	  are	  rejected	  or	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  be	  rejected.	  	  	  	  	  
While	  running	  regressions,	  I	  used	  a	  f-­‐test	  to	  see	  if	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis,	  that	  all	  the	  beta	  values	  equal	  zero,	  could	  be	  rejected.	  	  If	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  was	  rejected	  initially,	  I	  used	  a	  process	  of	  elimination	  and	  eliminated	  the	  independent	  variable	  with	  the	  lowest	  t-­‐statistic.	  	  I	  repeated	  this	  process	  until	  the	  t-­‐statistics	  no	  longer	  increased	  by	  the	  further	  eliminating	  of	  variables.	  	  In	  general,	  an	  absolute	  value	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greater	  then	  2	  is	  an	  acceptable	  value	  for	  the	  t-­‐statistics	  of	  the	  final	  regression.	  	  As	  mentioned,	  both	  PMNG	  and	  CONTYRS	  were	  used	  as	  dependent	  variables	  in	  regressions	  for	  both	  positions.	  	  Exhibit	  4	  shows	  the	  initial	  regression	  for	  running	  backs	  with	  PMNG	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  	  
	   Exhibit	  4:	  Running	  Back	  Initial	  Regression	  Analysis	  -­‐	  PMNG	  
Dependent Variable: PMNG  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 33   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.015510 1.038585 0.977782 0.3384 
AGE 0.014932 0.027070 0.551601 0.5865 
AVGTD -0.270880 0.419967 -0.645002 0.5253 
AVGTOUCH -0.006405 0.017452 -0.367017 0.7170 
AVGYDSATT -0.096249 0.109982 -0.875134 0.3905 
MISSED -0.012358 0.038449 -0.321421 0.7508 
NEWTEAM -0.172556 0.126102 -1.368387 0.1844 
VARTD -0.234363 0.227777 -1.028911 0.3142 
VARTOUCH -0.042321 0.337182 -0.125515 0.9012 
VARYDSATT 0.200562 0.493920 0.406062 0.6885 
     
     R-squared 0.174985    Mean dependent var 0.549934 
Adjusted R-squared -0.147847    S.D. dependent var 0.240961 
F-statistic 0.542032 Prob(F-statistic) 0.828767 	  
	   The	  regression	  analysis	  in	  Exhibit	  4	  shows	  an	  f-­‐statistic	  of	  about	  0.54.	  	  The	  critical	  value	  of	  an	  f-­‐test	  with	  33	  observations	  and	  9	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  is	  2.18.	  	  Because	  0.54	  is	  less	  than	  the	  critical	  value,	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  cannot	  be	  rejected.	  	  These	  results	  were	  not	  anticipated	  for	  the	  PMNG	  regression,	  as	  it	  seems	  that	  PMNG	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  Next,	  a	  regression	  was	  run	  with	  CONTYRS	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  the	  running	  back	  position.	  	  Since	  PMNG	  was	  not	  explained	  by	  the	  independent	  variables,	  I	  assumed	  that	  PMNG	  is	  an	  exogenous	  variable.	  	  Therefore,	  PMNG	  was	  included	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  in	  the	  initial	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regression	  to	  see	  if	  it	  is	  a	  determinant	  factor	  of	  CONTYRS.	  	  Exhibit	  5	  contains	  the	  regression	  analysis.	  	  
	   	  Exhibit	  5:	  Running	  Back	  Initial	  Regression	  Analysis	  -­‐	  CONTYRS	   	  
 
Dependent Variable: CONTYRS   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 33   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.600991 4.444291 0.585243 0.5643 
AGE -0.165022 0.114249 -1.444399 0.1627 
AVGTD 2.331541 1.776743 1.312256 0.2030 
AVGTOUCH -0.000433 0.073389 -0.005904 0.9953 
AVGYDSATT 1.183519 0.468759 2.524792 0.0193 
MISSED -0.497433 0.161573 -3.078682 0.0055 
NEWTEAM -0.357925 0.549837 -0.650965 0.5218 
VARTD 1.876337 0.976785 1.920931 0.0678 
VARTOUCH -1.260224 1.414260 -0.891084 0.3825 
VARYDSATT -4.003130 2.078379 -1.926083 0.0671 
PMNG 0.376185 0.874285 0.430278 0.6712 
     
     R-squared 0.768469    Mean dependent var 3.666667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.663228    S.D. dependent var 1.865252 
F-statistic 7.301988 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000054 
   Exhibit	  5	  shows	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  for	  the	  initial	  running	  back	  CONTYRS	  regression	  of	  7.30.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  critical	  value	  for	  an	  f-­‐test	  with	  33	  observations	  and	  10	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  is	  2.13,	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected.	  	  Therefore,	  CONTYRS	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  A	  process	  of	  elimination	  was	  conducted	  by	  eliminating	  the	  variable	  with	  the	  lowest	  t-­‐statistic.	  	  Exhibit	  6	  shows	  the	  final	  regression	  analysis	  for	  the	  running	  back	  regression.	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Exhibit	  6:	  Running	  Back	  Final	  Regression	  Analysis	  –	  CONTYRS	  
Dependent Variable: CONTYRS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 02/19/13   Time: 12:39   
Sample: 1 33    
Included observations: 33   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -3.584129 2.183601 -1.641385 0.1123 
AVGTD 3.486937 1.218775 2.861017 0.0081 
AVGYDSATT 1.382126 0.421952 3.275551 0.0029 
MISSED -0.547405 0.159857 -3.424335 0.0020 
VARYDSATT -3.897475 1.947053 -2.001730 0.0555 
VARTD 1.948148 0.849226 2.294027 0.0298 
     
     R-squared 0.709083 Mean dependent var 3.666667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.655209 S.D. dependent var 1.865252 
F-statistic 13.16198 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002 
     	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  Exhibit	  6,	  the	  process	  of	  elimination	  resulted	  in	  all	  independent	  variables	  showing	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  with	  an	  absolute	  value	  greater	  then	  2.	  	  All	  variables	  are	  also	  significant	  at	  the	  10%	  significance	  level.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  f-­‐statistic	  of	  13.16	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  critical	  value	  at	  the	  0.05	  error	  level	  with	  five	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  of	  2.50,	  so	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected.	  	  The	  regression	  shows	  that	  the	  length	  of	  contract	  that	  a	  player	  receives	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  variables	  that	  were	  compiled	  for	  this	  analysis.	  	  The	  only	  coefficients	  of	  variation	  variables	  for	  performance	  inconsistency	  that	  remain	  in	  the	  equation	  are	  VARYDSATT	  and	  VARTD.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  VARYDSATT	  is	  negative,	  which	  was	  expected.	  	  If	  a	  running	  back’s	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  of	  career	  yards	  per	  rush	  were	  to	  increase	  by	  one,	  or	  if	  their	  inconsistency	  increased,	  then	  they	  would	  receive	  on	  average	  3.90	  less	  years	  in	  their	  contract,	  holding	  everything	  else	  constant.	  	  While	  a	  change	  of	  1	  in	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  is	  unlikely,	  the	  effect	  demonstrated	  is	  the	  result	  that	  was	  expected.	  To	  put	  into	  a	  different	  perspective,	  a	  running	  back	  whose	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coefficient	  of	  variation	  in	  career	  yards	  per	  attempt	  is	  about	  0.72	  higher	  than	  another	  player’s	  can	  expect	  to	  receive	  one	  less	  year	  in	  contract	  length,	  holding	  everything	  else	  constant.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  VARTD’s	  coefficient	  is	  positive	  which	  is	  not	  what	  was	  expected.	  	  However,	  it	  remains	  significant	  in	  the	  regression	  none-­‐the-­‐less.	  	  Overall,	  given	  that	  the	  coefficient	  of	  the	  key	  statistic	  variable	  VARYDSATT	  is	  negative,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  inconsistency	  leads	  to	  shorter	  contracts	  is	  not	  rejected.	  	   As	  expected,	  the	  coefficients	  of	  AVGYDSATT	  and	  AVGTD	  in	  the	  equation	  are	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  	  This	  confirms	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  a	  player	  with	  higher	  average	  career	  statistics	  will	  receive	  more	  years	  in	  their	  contract	  then	  can	  be	  explained	  just	  by	  the	  performance	  inconsistency.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  teams	  are	  willing	  to	  put	  up	  more	  with	  inconsistency	  if	  the	  overall	  average	  of	  performance	  is	  higher.	  	  If	  a	  running	  back’s	  career	  yards	  per	  attempt	  is	  increased	  by	  1,	  then	  they	  would	  receive	  on	  average	  1.38	  more	  years	  in	  their	  contract	  holding	  all	  else	  constant.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  a	  running	  back	  scores	  five	  more	  touchdowns	  per	  season,	  or	  increases	  their	  career	  touchdown	  average	  per	  game	  by	  0.31,	  they	  would	  receive	  on	  average	  1.09	  more	  years	  on	  their	  contract,	  holding	  all	  else	  constant.	  	  The	  last	  variable,	  MISSED,	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  expected	  correlation	  with	  CONTYRS.	  	  If	  a	  running	  back’s	  career	  games	  missed	  per	  year	  increase	  by	  1,	  or	  if	  their	  susceptibility	  to	  injury	  is	  higher,	  then	  they	  would	  receive	  on	  average	  0.55	  less	  years	  on	  their	  contract,	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  increase	  in	  games	  missed	  per	  year	  of	  2,	  which	  is	  highly	  plausible	  in	  a	  sport	  such	  as	  football,	  would	  result	  in	  a	  contract	  that	  is	  a	  year	  shorter	  in	  length,	  holding	  all	  else	  constant.	  	  Again,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  an	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increase	  in	  injury	  risk	  as	  represented	  by	  games	  missed	  per	  year	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  shorter	  contract	  is	  not	  rejected	  because	  of	  the	  negative	  coefficient	  on	  MISSED.	  	  	  	   It	  is	  worth	  discussing	  variables	  that	  were	  hypothesized	  to	  effect	  the	  dependent	  variables	  but	  proved	  to	  be	  insignificant.	  	  For	  example,	  AGE	  or	  SEASONS	  were	  not	  significant	  in	  the	  running	  back	  regression	  on	  CONTYRS.	  	  While	  this	  was	  predicted	  to	  be	  a	  measure	  of	  running	  back	  riskiness,	  it	  dropped	  out.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  risk	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  MISSED	  variable,	  which	  does	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  length	  of	  contract	  that	  a	  running	  back	  receives.	  	  Also,	  the	  variables	  of	  VARTOUCH	  and	  AVGTOUCH	  dropped	  out,	  but	  this	  was	  considered	  highly	  possible	  from	  the	  beginning.	  	  The	  PMNG	  independent	  variable	  also	  dropped	  out	  which	  is	  surprising.	  	  Basically,	  the	  CONTYRS	  variable	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  PMNG.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  length	  of	  a	  contract	  offered	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  unguaranteed	  money,	  failing	  to	  show	  evidence	  of	  any	  trade-­‐off	  scenario	  between	  the	  considered	  dependent	  variables.	  	  It	  seems	  logical	  to	  assume	  that	  a	  player	  would	  have	  to	  accept	  a	  shorter	  contract	  if	  they	  wanted	  more	  guaranteed	  money,	  but	  the	  regression	  results	  find	  no	  evidence	  of	  any	  correlation	  between	  these	  two	  variables.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  NEWTEAM	  variable	  that	  was	  predicted	  to	  add	  uncertainty	  to	  a	  player	  and	  result	  in	  less	  years	  of	  contract	  did	  not	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  determining	  factor	  in	  CONTYRS.	  	  	   In	  conclusion,	  the	  regression	  for	  running	  backs	  using	  CONTYRS	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable	  produced	  results	  that	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  my	  paper.	  	  The	  equation	  demonstrates	  that	  if	  a	  player	  is	  less	  consistent	  in	  terms	  of	  performance	  or	  more	  likely	  to	  get	  injured	  then	  they	  will	  receive	  a	  shorter	  contract.	  	  Players	  with	  these	  conditions	  would	  be	  considered	  riskier	  and	  would	  receive	  shorter	  contracts	  as	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a	  result.	  	  From	  a	  team’s	  perspective,	  contract	  length	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  tool	  that	  reflects	  the	  riskiness	  of	  a	  player.	  	  They	  will	  offer	  longer	  contracts	  to	  less	  risky	  players	  who	  they	  are	  more	  certain	  about	  and	  shorter	  contracts	  for	  riskier	  players.	  	  In	  essence,	  teams	  protect	  themselves	  from	  risk	  by	  offering	  shorter	  contracts	  to	  riskier	  running	  backs,	  which	  confirms	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  in	  a	  contract	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  reflect	  the	  riskiness	  of	  player.	  	  	  Wide	  receivers	  were	  then	  tested	  to	  look	  for	  similar	  results	  that	  were	  obtained	  from	  running	  back	  regressions.	  	  The	  same	  process	  that	  was	  used	  for	  running	  backs	  will	  be	  used	  for	  wide	  receivers,	  again	  testing	  PMNG	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable	  first.	  	  Exhibit	  7	  shows	  the	  regression	  analysis.	  
Exhibit	  7:	  Wide	  Receiver	  Initial	  Regression	  Analysis	  –	  PMNG	  
Dependent Variable: PMNG  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 43   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.758474 0.288422 2.629733 0.0129 
AGE 0.004385 0.008053 0.544540 0.5897 
AVGTD 0.154045 0.231239 0.666170 0.5099 
AVGTOUCH -0.047906 0.029618 -1.617455 0.1153 
AVGYDSATT -0.010544 0.010936 -0.964124 0.3420 
MISSED -0.007421 0.019309 -0.384316 0.7032 
NEWTEAM 0.017805 0.045296 0.393073 0.6968 
VARTD 0.235553 0.114983 2.048595 0.0485 
VARTOUCH -0.254495 0.201073 -1.265686 0.2145 
VARYDSATT -0.379788 0.396956 -0.956750 0.3457 
     
     R-squared 0.178146    Mean dependent var 0.594901 
Adjusted R-squared -0.045996    S.D. dependent var 0.135417 
F-statistic 0.794793 Prob(F-statistic) 0.62324 
    	  	   Exhibit	  7	  shows	  an	  f-­‐statistic	  of	  about	  0.79	  for	  the	  wide	  receiver	  PMNG	  initial	  regression.	  	  The	  critical	  value	  for	  an	  f-­‐test	  with	  43	  observations	  and	  9	  degrees	  of	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freedom	  is	  2.11.	  	  Again,	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  for	  the	  PMNG	  regression	  cannot	  be	  rejected	  because	  its	  f-­‐statistic	  is	  less	  than	  the	  critical	  value.	  	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  PMNG	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  discovery	  of	  the	  PMNG	  variable,	  I	  included	  it	  as	  a	  exogenous	  independent	  variable	  and	  tested	  CONTYRS	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable	  for	  the	  running	  back	  position.	  	  Exhibit	  8	  shows	  the	  initial	  regression	  analysis.	  	   Exhibit	  8:	  Wide	  Receiver	  Initial	  Regression	  Analysis	  –	  CONTYRS	  
Dependent Variable: CONTYRS   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 43   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11.88281 3.065047 3.876878 0.0005 
AGE -0.397641 0.078161 -5.087489 0.0000 
AVGTD 2.794916 2.249349 1.242544 0.2231 
AVGTOUCH 0.443163 0.297319 1.490530 0.1459 
AVGYDSATT 0.131996 0.107148 1.231900 0.2270 
MISSED -0.016348 0.186993 -0.087428 0.9309 
NEWTEAM -0.967999 0.438700 -2.206515 0.0346 
VARTD -0.364543 1.179568 -0.309048 0.7593 
VARTOUCH 4.705084 1.989486 2.364975 0.0243 
VARYDSATT -6.235164 3.888463 -1.603504 0.1186 
PMNG -1.965609 1.682044 -1.168584 0.2512 
     
     R-squared 0.560899    Mean dependent var 4.186047 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423680    S.D. dependent var 1.762787 
F-statistic 4.087621 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001109 	  	   Exhibit	  8	  shows	  an	  f-­‐statistic	  of	  about	  4.09.	  	  This	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  critical	  value	  with	  43	  observations	  and	  10	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  of	  2.06.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected	  and	  CONTYRS	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  The	  process	  of	  elimination	  will	  be	  repeated	  to	  get	  a	  reduced	  form	  of	  the	  CONTYRS	  wide	  receiver	  regression.	  	  Exhibit	  9	  shows	  the	  regression	  analysis	  once	  the	  lowest	  t-­‐statistic	  variables	  were	  eliminated.	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Exhibit	  9:	  Wide	  Receiver	  Final	  Regression	  Analysis	  -­‐	  CONTYRS	  
Dependent Variable: CONTYRS   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 43   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 13.50996 2.148010 6.289526 0.0000 
AGE -0.398055 0.077993 -5.103732 0.0000 
AVGTD 5.664758 1.601476 3.537212 0.0011 
NEWTEAM -1.091026 0.438223 -2.489661 0.0174 
VARYDSATT -7.198578 3.493380 -2.060634 0.0464 
VARTOUCH 3.816389 1.458838 2.616048 0.0128 
     
     R-squared 0.481043    Mean dependent var 4.186047 
Adjusted R-squared 0.410913    S.D. dependent var 1.762787 
F-statistic 6.859363 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000128 
     
     	  
	   The	  process	  of	  elimination	  resulted	  in	  five	  remaining	  independent	  variables,	  all	  with	  t-­‐statistic	  absolute	  values	  greater	  than	  two	  and	  significant	  at	  the	  5%	  confidence	  level.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  f-­‐statistic	  of	  6.86,	  as	  seen	  in	  Exhibit	  9,	  is	  greater	  then	  the	  critical	  value	  of	  2.43,	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  can	  be	  rejected.	  	  Although	  the	  wide	  receiver	  regression	  in	  Exhibit	  6	  contains	  different	  variables	  then	  the	  running	  back	  regression,	  CONTYRS	  seems	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  considered	  variables.	  	  Again,	  VARYDSATT,	  which	  was	  predicted	  to	  be	  the	  best	  measure	  of	  performance	  inconsistency,	  remains	  in	  the	  wide	  receiver	  equation.	  	  The	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐7.20	  is	  significantly	  greater	  but	  is	  negative	  as	  expected.	  	  If	  a	  wide	  receiver’s	  VARYDSATT,	  or	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  in	  career	  yards	  per	  catch	  increases	  by	  1,	  then	  they	  would	  receive	  7.20	  less	  years	  on	  average	  in	  their	  contract,	  holding	  everything	  else	  constant.	  	  This	  increase	  is	  a	  little	  too	  dramatic,	  but	  an	  increase	  in	  VARYDSATT	  of	  0.14,	  which	  is	  the	  average	  value	  in	  the	  data	  set,	  would	  result	  in	  an	  average	  decrease	  of	  1	  year	  in	  a	  wide	  receiver’s	  contract.	  	  Again,	  the	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numbers	  prove	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  performance	  inconsistency	  would	  result	  in	  a	  shorter	  contract	  because	  the	  wide	  receiver	  would	  be	  riskier.	  	  However,	  the	  other	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  variable,	  VARTOUCH,	  comes	  with	  a	  bit	  of	  surprise.	  	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  coefficient	  is	  positive	  which	  is	  not	  what	  would	  be	  expected,	  much	  like	  the	  VARTD	  variable	  in	  the	  running	  back	  regression.	  	  However,	  the	  variable	  remains	  statistically	  significant	  and	  remains	  in	  the	  regression.	  	  Yards	  per	  attempt	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  best	  statistic	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  measuring	  performance	  inconsistency.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  performance	  inconsistency	  leads	  to	  shorter	  contracts	  is	  not	  rejected.	  	   AVGTD,	  which	  was	  in	  the	  running	  back	  regression,	  also	  remains	  in	  the	  wide	  receiver	  regression	  and	  with	  a	  similar	  effect.	  	  An	  increase	  in	  1	  in	  touchdowns	  per	  game	  would	  lead	  to	  5.66	  more	  years	  in	  contract	  length.	  	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  AVGTD	  variable	  at	  both	  positions	  shows	  that	  players	  are	  rewarded	  with	  more	  years	  in	  their	  contract	  for	  being	  a	  touchdown	  threat	  then	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  their	  riskiness.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  player	  who	  has	  averaged	  0.18	  more	  touchdowns	  per	  game	  will	  receive	  an	  additional	  year	  in	  their	  contract	  compared	  to	  a	  player	  with	  equal	  riskiness	  in	  terms	  of	  performance	  inconsistency	  and	  age	  or	  injury	  risk.	  	  	   The	  most	  alarming	  difference	  in	  the	  wide	  receiver	  equation	  is	  that	  AGE	  remains	  statistically	  significant	  while	  MISSED	  does	  not.	  	  The	  age	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐0.40	  is	  negative	  but	  is	  lower	  then	  expected.	  	  To	  put	  into	  perspective,	  an	  increase	  in	  AGE	  of	  a	  wide	  receiver	  by	  3	  years	  will	  result	  in	  on	  average	  1.20	  less	  years	  in	  their	  contract	  holding	  everything	  else	  constant.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  shorter	  contracts	  in	  this	  case	  do	  seem	  to	  reflect	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  wide	  receiver	  in	  terms	  of	  age.	  	  However,	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shorter	  contracts	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  reflect	  MISSED	  for	  some	  reason.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  for	  wide	  receivers,	  injury	  risk	  is	  assumed	  due	  to	  increased	  age	  but	  not	  because	  of	  the	  average	  of	  games	  missed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  career.	  	  Since	  wide	  receivers	  seem	  to	  last	  longer	  in	  the	  NFL,	  as	  shown	  by	  a	  higher	  average	  age	  at	  the	  position	  compared	  to	  running	  backs,	  AGE	  ends	  up	  being	  a	  more	  important	  variable.	  	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  average	  running	  back	  misses	  more	  games	  due	  to	  injury	  than	  a	  wide	  receiver	  does.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  running	  back	  position	  is	  in	  general	  more	  susceptible	  to	  injury.	  	  All	  in	  all,	  it	  seems	  that	  running	  backs	  do	  not	  last	  long	  enough	  in	  the	  league	  due	  to	  injuries	  for	  age	  to	  become	  a	  factor	  when	  negotiating	  contracts.	  	  On	  the	  flip	  side,	  wide	  receivers	  do	  not	  show	  as	  much	  injury	  history	  and	  last	  in	  the	  league	  longer,	  but	  become	  riskier	  as	  they	  become	  too	  aged.	  	  	   One	  final	  observation	  from	  the	  wide	  receiver	  equation	  is	  that	  NEWTEAM	  is	  a	  significant	  variable,	  which	  it	  was	  not	  for	  running	  backs.	  	  A	  wide	  receiver	  that	  is	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team	  would	  receive	  on	  average	  1.09	  less	  years	  in	  their	  contract,	  holding	  all	  else	  constant.	  	  At	  least	  at	  the	  wide	  receiver	  position,	  the	  results	  show	  evidence	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  a	  wide	  receiver	  coming	  to	  a	  new	  team	  who	  is	  unfamiliar	  with	  him	  would	  come	  with	  more	  uncertainty.	  	  Teams	  would	  view	  this	  as	  risk	  and	  respond	  by	  offering	  a	  shorter	  contract	  to	  the	  wide	  receiver.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  why	  this	  NEWTEAM	  dummy	  variable	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  running	  back	  position,	  but	  seems	  to	  capture	  the	  behavior	  of	  NFL	  teams	  during	  contract	  negotiations	  none-­‐the-­‐less.	  	   Overall,	  the	  length	  of	  contract	  that	  a	  player	  receives,	  but	  not	  the	  percentage	  of	  unguaranteed	  money,	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  player.	  	  The	  two	  dependent	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variables	  also	  showed	  no	  correlation	  with	  each	  other,	  eliminating	  the	  trade-­‐off	  scenario	  hypothesis	  between	  unguaranteed	  money	  and	  contract	  years.	  	  NFL	  teams	  seem	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  risk	  that	  comes	  with	  signing	  a	  player	  by	  offering	  shorter	  contracts.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  money	  that	  is	  unguaranteed	  in	  these	  contracts	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  random.	  	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  capture	  the	  amount	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  a	  contract	  and	  put	  it	  into	  an	  objective	  measure.	  	  Percent	  of	  money	  not	  guaranteed	  might	  not	  accurately	  reflect	  how	  much	  risk	  the	  team	  is	  transferring	  to	  the	  player.	  None-­‐the-­‐less,	  the	  regressions	  with	  CONTYRS	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable	  were	  surprisingly	  significant	  considering	  the	  low	  number	  of	  observations.	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Chapter	  V:	  	  Conclusion	  	  	   While	  the	  results	  were	  not	  exactly	  expected,	  the	  regression	  analysis	  did	  lead	  to	  interesting	  findings.	  	  NFL	  teams	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  use	  unguaranteed	  money	  strategically	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  risky	  players.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  amount	  of	  unguaranteed	  money	  offered	  does	  not	  correlate	  with	  the	  independent	  variable	  measures	  of	  risk.	  	  The	  unguaranteed	  money	  in	  the	  contracts	  of	  the	  data	  set	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  random.	  	  Unguaranteed	  money	  also	  did	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  traded	  off	  with	  contract	  length,	  as	  the	  unguaranteed	  money	  variable	  was	  not	  significant	  in	  the	  contract	  length	  regression.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  NFL	  teams	  do	  use	  length	  of	  contract	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  risky	  players.	  	  The	  length	  of	  contract	  reflects	  how	  risky	  a	  player	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  performance	  inconsistency	  and	  injury	  or	  age	  risk.	  	  Additionally,	  players	  who	  have	  higher	  career	  averages	  in	  key	  statistics	  will	  receive	  longer	  contracts	  then	  players	  with	  the	  same	  risk.	  	  NFL	  teams	  will	  accept	  more	  inconsistency	  if	  the	  overall	  average	  of	  performance	  is	  higher.	  	  Lastly,	  although	  signing	  with	  a	  new	  team	  seems	  to	  result	  in	  shorter	  contracts	  for	  wide	  receivers,	  it	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  contract	  length	  of	  running	  backs.	  	  The	  hypothesis	  about	  uncertainty	  of	  signing	  unfamiliar	  players	  resulting	  in	  more	  risk	  protection	  is	  inconclusive.	  	  	  	   Further	  research	  can	  be	  done	  to	  clarify	  the	  conclusions	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  First	  off,	  more	  observations	  can	  be	  included	  to	  achieve	  more	  accurate	  regression	  results.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  roster	  players	  in	  a	  single	  year	  provides	  limitations,	  so	  past	  and	  future	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